Iran and Qatar joint venture-supporting terrorism

IFMAT - South Pars North Dome Condensate Field Game ON

Iran and Qatar joint venture-supporting terrorism
South Pars/North Dome Condensate Field – GAME ON !





In the past South Pars/North Dome Condensate Field was mostly used by Qatar, but since Qatar’s sanctions are underway, Iran stepped out to “help” Qatar in this difficult period, or better said to help itself in becoming relevant (financially and strategically).

Now allies – Qatar and Iran are stronger together, which make them better supporters of terrorism, and it’s easier for them to reach their goals.

Is the world so blind to see, or consciously allows this to happen?

After our explanation, you’ll have no excuse for collaborating with designated entities who finance terrorism. In the future, you’ll deliberately support terror.


⚠ Facts:

Iran assisting Qatar economically
There is a massive presence of IRGC commanders in Qatar
Qatar refuses the Saudi’s demand to cut its connections with Iran as well as to expel the IRGC figures from Qatar
Qatar and Iran initiate a joint venture in Pars gas field in order to export gas the Far East.
The IRGC is playing a major role in this JV
Turkey is standing with Qatar in this crises by helping Qatar financially and military
Bank Saderat (still a designated bank) operates freely in Doha

IFMAT - Iran and Qatar - facts_iranqat


Iran – Qatar Economic Relations Prior to the Boycott


Iranian – Qatari Cooperation in South Pars/North Dome Condensate Field

     The world’s largest gas field, South Pars is located 100 km to the south of the Iranian coast in the Persian Gulf on the common border between Iran and Qatar. South Pars covers an area of 9,700 square kilometers; 6,000 square kilometers are situated in Qatar’s territorial waters (About 62 percent) and 3,700 square kilometers are in Iranian waters. North Dome gas field in Qatar is drawn from the common border of Iran and Qatar to the coast of that country. Development for the South Pars gas field has been divided into 24 phases. In 2010, the contract to develop five projects of South Pars consists of phases 13, 14, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 and was signed with local contractors affiliated with or controlled by the IRGC.
     The fear of natural gas (n.g. and liquefied natural gas – l.n.g.) migration from South Pars to North Dome is an issue that periodically resurfaces. Iran is concerned that Qatar’s extensive exploitation of its side of the field could impair the Iranian side. Qatar uses at least twice as much gas out of the common field than does Iran. In order to address this and balance usage on both sides of the maritime border, Iran needs to extract natural gas as quickly as the Qataris.
In 2005, Qatar issued a moratorium on all new projects in the North Field, ensuring that the amount of natural gas extracted each year will not increase in the immediate future. This measure was partially intended to allay Iranian fears and ameliorate tensions. The natural competition between Qatar and Iran on the North Dome/South Pars field has largely been contained, as any escalation is not in the economic interest of either side.
     After Iranian President Hassan Rouhani was elected in 2013, Iran established channels of communication and formed teams to coordinate a boost in joint gas exploration and production between the two countries.
In November 2016, Iran, suffering from a severe domestic gas shortage, rapidly increased production from South Pars and signed a preliminary deal with France’s Total S.A. to develop the South Pars II project. Iran signed a $4.8 billion n.g. development project with Total S.A. and China National Petroleum Corp. in its first joint venture with international partners since sanctions were eased.
     In May 2016, Iranian and Qatari officials called for establishing a joint technical committee to coordinate gas output from the section of South pars located on the Iranian and Qatari common border.
    In April 2017, Rouhani inaugurated eight development projects of South Pars Gas Field – 20-billion-dollar worth of projects concerning five phases of the field, including phases 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21. Iran is scheduled to develop 28 blocks of the field, divided into 24 phases, to produce 790 million cubic meters of gas per day. When these phases become operational (expected in the near future), Iran will boost production from its side of the field and enable Iran to balance its gas output from the joint field with Qatar or even exceed Qatar’s production level. This will end the two decades of production gap between Iran and Qatar, which Iran has already begun to close. Iran is projected to out produce Qatar by 2018.[1]     [2]
     Concurrently, both Qatar and Iran have been impacted by the decrease in n.g. and l.n.g. prices since 2016. Qatar, which prides itself as the the largest l.n.g. producer in the world, has had to increase production in order to cover sunk costs even when the net return is low. This has been necessary in order to appease banks that rely on cash flow from l.n.g. and foreign partners invested in their plants.


April 2017 – Qatar lifts the moratorium

     There has been speculation that Qatar lifted the moratorium in response to the spike in Iranian competition. However, it is important to note that Qatar ended the moratorium, as the l.n.g. market was flooded by a spike in increased supplies from Australia and the United States that drove prices down and as Russia announced its intentions to increase production.

     Whatever the case, Qatar originally sought to build an LNG pipeline to the Mediterranean via Saudi Arabia, Syria and Turkey in order to export new volumes of future n.g. production. However, this was blocked by Asad in favor of an Iran-Iraq-Syria route. Some observers surmise that Qatari indignation over Asad’s refusal to acquiesce has motivated Qatari support for anti-Asad Sunni militants. Unable to pressure Asad through the anti-government militants, Qatar has turned East to their biggest customers in Asia in order to export. The existing pipeline infrastructure for East bound l.n.g. export is controlled by Iran. This strategy therefore necessitates increased Iranian-Qatari cooperation and moves towards a joint venture.


The Boycott

     These recent developments – major billion dollar deals and cooperation lurching towards joint venture – seem to be the last straw for Saudi Arabia. Beyond the demands for Qatar to cease its support for terrorist groups, the boycott is likely designed to pre-emptively punish Qatar for its steps towards a joint venture with Iran to supply Asia with LNG priced in yuan.


Iran – Qatar Economic Relations after the Boycott


     The boycott is bringing Qatar closer to Iran, Turkey, and Iraq. Iran is now supplying 40% of food supply to Qatar to replace Saudi supplies. Qatar’s maritime border with Iran became Doha’s food security lifeline. Since the embargoes went into effect, Tehran has provided 1,100 tons of fruits and vegetables to Qatar on a daily basis. Iran’s Bushehr Port has become a key commercial center between Iran and Qatar. Iran has enabled Qatar to remain solvent by permitting Qatari vessels loaded with l.n.g. to transit Iranian waters.[1]   [2]
     Also, Iranian airspace has proven vital for Qatar Airways flights. Iran has opened up its airspace to around 100 new Qatari flights daily, upping its air traffic by 17%.
     Qatar, keenly aware of the danger in over reliance and dependence on Iran, is looking to other regional players. Qatar has been accepting humanitarian and security assistance from Turkey in addition to European and Asian countries. Turkey’s parliament has also approved sending troops to be stationed in Qatar.
     Also, in late June, Qatari Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdul Rahman Al Thani visited Baghdad and met with Iraqi President Abadi to discuss opening a Qatari embassy. The Iraqi Speaker of Parliament (who hails from the Iraqi Islamic Party, a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate) recently discussed mutual investment opportunities. [1]   [2]
     The prospect of an emergent Qatar – Iran – Iraq economic and political axis obviously benefits Iran and could better position Qatar to assume its desired role as a major hub in the region. This unintended effect might explain why Saudi Arabia and its partners modified their demands on July 5th, 2017.


⚠Outcome


Iran exploiting Qatar’s diplomatic weakness to conquer parts of the Middle East

a. Support the Iranian stronghold in Yemen
b. Annexing Qatar under Iran’s influence
c. Using Qatar as a passage to the western world
d. IRGC is forming entities in Qatar and using Qatari’s financial system

Iran is using Qatar to strengthen its economy

a. Iran – Qatar JV to develop Pars gas field
b. Iran – Qatar JV to export gas to the Far East
c. Iranian banks using the Qatari banking system to extend its financial capabilities in the west
d. Iranian sanctioned banks operate in Qatar in foreign currencies despite sanctions


⚠Conclusion

The synergy among Iran, Qatar and Turkey present a much higher risk to the world while providing more resources and options to each one of them.

There will be more money for financing terrorism, and we all saw the consequences of latest terror attacks in the world, Barcelona, Manila, Paris, London, etc.

We understand managers desire for a lot of money, or the big corporations’ needs of money (only), but dear ladies and gentlemen NOT for all COSTS! Not for the cost of losing innocent lives, not with the people who are supporting that. Open your eyes! Don’t make the world miserable place to live in- only because of profit. Find another way to make money- not trough supporting terrorism!

We give you proofs on many occasions, which show you that Iran is leaded by terrorism supporting regime, also a regime who is terrorist cell by itself, please think about what you’re doing!


Let’s contribute for a better world, world without violence!