Russian President Vladimir Putin says he has a black belt in judo, which, as he likes to say, has taught him an important life lesson—flexibility.
Indeed, no tenet has further influenced Russia’s political doctrine, especially on the international stage.
Despite a 30-year alliance, Russia did not intervene after Azerbaijan took back Nagorno-Karabakh – a region Armenia had earlier seized with Russian help. After 32 years of somewhat friendly relations, Russia also abruptly became hostile toward Israel. And after more than 20 years of tepid ties, Russia bolstered relations with Saudi Arabia.
Putin these days easily pivots according to his interests. Armenia has been reorienting itself to the West. Taking an anti-Israel stance over Gaza helped ingratiate Moscow with Iran, buck the United States, and boost Russia’s appeal in the developing world. Saudi Arabia and Russia have discovered mutual interests in Syria, Turkey, and oil production.
But now Russia may be preparing for yet another pivot—this time away from Iran.
There are two clear reasons for a change in policy—weakening Iran in Syria and Armenia and using its position as a player in the Middle East to gain concessions for a peace deal in Ukraine.
To be sure, Russia and Iran have been cooperating at an unprecedented level recently.
In September, Iran supplied Russia with short-range ballistic missiles. Both countries are on the cusp of signing a much-anticipated strategic treaty that would include closer defense cooperation. Recently, the two nations linked their banking systems to help evade Western sanctions.
But despite such cooperation, the countries don’t see eye-to-eye about what to do in regions where both have immense influence.
And nowhere is that more evident than in Syria.
To remain in power during the Syrian civil war that nearly ousted him, President Bashar al-Assad invited in Russia and Iran, sacrificing Syria’s independence. And while Moscow and Tehran have found cooperation points, they have opposing goals. Russia wants Syria to remain its stable regional vassal while Iran wants to continue using Damascus in its war with Israel.
Before invading Ukraine in 2022, Russia had almost total say in Syria, especially after installing the S-400 missile system, which is capable of intercepting F-16 fighter jets. As an Israeli defense official said at the time, “a fly can’t buzz above Syria without Russian consent.”
Russia held this over Israel and Iran, leading both parties to cater to Putin. Sometimes Moscow would let Iran smuggle weapons through Syria to Hezbollah; sometimes it would allow Israel to bomb Iranian targets. It wasn’t the first time Moscow inserted itself in the middle of a conflict to gain power over both sides. It has used similar tactics with Armenia and Azerbaijan, selling weapons to both sides.
Following the invasion of Ukraine, Russia quickly diverted resources to fund the war effort, including from Syria. Iran hurried to fill the vacuum.
But over the past year, the situation has been reversed. Israel has decimated Iran’s top proxy, Hezbollah, weakening the Iranian position in Syria. In turn, Russia’s position there is now stronger.
A desperate Iran may now try to further utilize Syria against Israel. But this would likely be a red line for Moscow.
Aleksander Lavrentiev, Putin’s special representative to Syria, said recently that Russia would do “everything possible” to prevent conflict from spreading to Syria. Over the past year, Russia has blocked Iranian proxies from operating in southern Syria and set up observation posts along the Syrian-Israeli border following Israeli assassinations of high ranking Iranian officials. It has not once activated its missile defense systems to counter Israeli attacks.
Israel has sought to exploit this clash of interests as it did before the war. Despite Russian-Israeli relations suffering when Russia sided politically against Israel immediately after the Oct. 7, 2023, massacre, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been careful not to take steps that would sever ties with Moscow, such as arming Ukraine.
Such strategy has kept the door open for cooperation in Syria. Earlier this year, Iranian hardliners accused both Putin and Assad of betraying Iran by allowing Israel to strike Iranian targets in Syria. During the Israeli missile attack on Iran last month in response to Tehran’s missile attack, a high ranking advisor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei allegedly accused Assad of treason for not preventing Israel from using Syrian airspace or warning Iran of the strike. But considering Syria isn’t in control of its own skies, if there is blame, it lies strictly with Russia.
Israel’s decision to avoid provoking Russia may have in part also led to Russia’s slow-walking the delivery of Su-35 fighter jets to Iran, as well as negotiations over the S-400 missile system to Iran. Such advanced weapon systems would empower Iran by bolstering its defenses and Soviet-era air force.
But Russia prefers its allies to be dependent—otherwise they may act against Russian interests. If Iran becomes too powerful, then it would have more say in regions of mutual interest. Also, if Iran was to deploy such weapon systems in combat with Israel, Israeli pilots could discover vulnerabilities and pass them on to the United States.
Meanwhile, just last week, Netanyahu confidante Ron Dermer went to Russia to help secure a cease-fire deal in Lebanon. A key Israeli demand is that weapons will no longer be shipped through Syria.
Should Russia help stop the flow of Iranian weapons, it would lead to more strain on Russian-Iranian relations. There is already tension over Armenia, where Russia wants to oversee the establishment of a corridor connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan province through Armenia. Iran called the corridor a “red line” as it would lead to its geopolitical rival Azerbaijan and competitor Turkey controlling its northern border instead of its close ally Armenia.
Iran has no illusions about its relationship with Russia. As Mehdi Sobhani, the Iranian ambassador to Armenia, former envoy to Syria and likely high ranking intelligence officer said recently, “We are not allies. We have some differences, and we have some mutual interests.”
Indeed, given the incoming U.S. administration’s desire for a quick peace deal in Ukraine, Putin may use Russia’s ability to prevent the transport of Iranian weapons in Syria as a trump card in negotiations.
The connecting thread tying together Russia’s actions is expansionism. Moscow wants to maximize its global influence. And unlike the Soviet Union, Putin’s Russia is not tied down by any ideology preventing opportunism.
If Putin deems selling out Iran will help Russian interests, he will not hesitate.
Source » newsweek