After Iran attacked Israel with almost 200 surface-to-surface missiles, Israel vowed to retaliate. It is not our place to ask what would be proportional, why there should or should not be a retaliation for the unprecedented Iranian attack, or whether Israel has to coordinate with the EU and the US or even get their permission. We will take the opportunity to analyze possible targets, why they would be considered, what’s to be said against them, and somewhat of the probability they’d be chosen.
Nuclear sites
Generally speaking, nuclear sites are completely legit. Iran is not compliant with the NPT, is not compliant with the IAEA, is deliberately enriching to a much higher level than needed for civilian use, and refuses to acknowledge having had a weaponization group dedicated to developing a nuclear device. Iran is a nuclear bully, her aspirations were made clear in the past, and there is no doubt that Iran wants at least the status of a threshold nuclear power.
There are various nuclear sites, starting with nuclear reactors, like the power reactor in Bushehr, the research reactor in Tehran, and the zero-power reactor in the ENTC near Esfahan. You can count on the IR-40 in Arak, which has been shut down, but was clearly meant to produce weapons-grade plutonium, and a long list of planned reactors of various kinds, led by the already announced but delayed reactor in Darkovin.
One should consider enrichment sites, led by Fordow, which is a highly fortified underground facility, and Natanz (Kashan), which is the largest facility, planned to host about 50K centrifuges. These sites are either hard to crack or easily rebuildable. Another option in this field is to attack the produce of these facilities, meaning the enriched Uranium, especially the containers of 60% enriched produce.
The UCF, the Uranium conversion facility is yet another option. It is part of the ENTC mentioned above and is used for the conversion of yellow cake into UF6, the compound that is later fed into the centrifuges to enrich Uranium. It also contains a re-conversion facility, which turns the enriched (and depleted) Uranium from the UF6 compound back to metal. This can be used to manufacture fuel rods of low-enriched Uranium, but also to produce pits of high enriched Uranium used in an atomic bomb.
Besides those, various sites produce the technology, like centrifuge parts, piping, and control systems, led by TESA, FARAYAND TECHNIC, and the like. University labs, mainly in IRGC and Defense Ministry-owned Universities, like Malek Ashtar and Imam Hussein, but also Shahid Beheshti, were sanctioned for their involvement in Iran’s nuclear program.
There is a large variety of targets for an attack on the Iranian nuclear program and Iran’s attitude towards international controlling entities and her own commitment is grounds enough to make them a legitimate target. On the other hand, attacks on nuclear facilities might bear heavily on the environment. In some cases, intelligence services lack the information of what exactly is in those sites and what might be dispersed in the air, once the site is attacked.
The international community has made it clear, that the Iranian nuclear project concerns it deeply. The involvement of IAEA, the sanctions by various countries as well as the security council of the UN, all point to the conclusion, that this is not a problem for Israel alone. True, earlier nuclear threats on and in the region were dealt with singlehandedly, as in the case of the Osirak reactor in Iraq and the Syrian reactor in Deir Ez-Zur. The case of Iran is more complex. It is well known, monitored for decades, has a civilian façade, and is widely spread. As such, it should be a combined international effort to stop the Iranian nuclear project, probably led by the US administration.
Nonetheless, the possibility of an attack on production sites or labs as part of the retaliation should not be ignored.
Missile and drone factories and production facilities
There is no target more legitimate on any level. There is an international consensus about the unprecedented missile attacks on Israel on two occasions. Iranian missiles and drones are met by Western troops and technologies in several theatres, including the Ukraine, Iraq, and the Houthi rebels’ terror on the shipping routes in the area. Should these facilities be attacked, and should the heavy machining technology be destroyed, it’d be surely welcomed by most Western countries. Better even, if the warehouses of the finished but not yet delivered units were destroyed too on this occasion.
Although part of the manufacturing equipment can be moved and hidden, this alone would already stop the production. The heavy equipment cannot be easily moved, if at all, as in most cases, it has to be cemented on-site to provide the needed stability of the foundation. There should be a general effort of all Western countries to provide updated information that allows the best possible outcome for such an attack.
Command and Control facilities
The advantage of C3 facilities is that they are by definition military targets and host at least some high-ranking officers. On the other hand, these facilities are usually well shielded, mostly underground, which demands high precision and special ammunition. Given proof of the presence of such high officials, especially if this is/ are IRGC facility/ies, an attack could have profound ramifications and consequences on the chain of command. Nevertheless, as there is no ground attack planned or plausible, there is no real point except personal punishment. It might look appropriate, but the outcome would have only little impact unless the attack would be coordinated on several C3 sites. Because of the fortifications and the needed ammunition, a coordinated strike is not plausible.
Civilian infrastructures
Generally speaking, these targets are less preferable but not a “non-starter”. Power plants are a weak point, as even now the blackouts are very common. This would hurt the civilian population and could turn into an upheaval, just as much as water supply and telecommunication. Most of the suffering would be on the population and therefore, not recommended. Oil production facilities would hurt mostly the regime and its income sources, they are soft targets and highly accessible. On the other hand, the environmental damages could be enormous and the price of oil might cause the West high losses, especially if Iran counters and attacks the oil production facilities of its neighbors.
Another option could be transportation hubs, like ports and airports with an emphasis on military installations. Again, soft targets and well accessible. Almost no collateral damage, except ships, planes, and containers still owned by foreign agents. The impact could be severe and lasting, financially as well as publicity-wise.
Symbols of the Iranian regime
This option reoccurs in various forms and levels. From the Azadi Tower, through the Majlis and the chancellery of the supreme leader and the presidency. These options are symbolic, expose the weakness of the regime as it cannot protect its own symbols, and might give strength to opposition forces. This option is humiliating, with a high probability of not eliminating high-ranking officials, and sends a clear message.
Conclusion
There are many legitimate targets for a retaliation attack. Although we divided between the groups of targets, it was not meant to imply that the choice has to be on one group only. Moreover, we don’t imply that there must be an attack, and if there is an attack, it doesn’t have to be in a single wave or date. Any combination is possible. Such an attack can be focused on one group, but include a target from another. It can be focused geographically and include all groups represented in the area. Whatever the choice, it will have to be coordinated and possibly sanctioned at least by the US and maybe other Western nations. The intention is allegedly to strike in a way that stops the pendulum of attack and counterattack. It will have one message – don’t. This time we mean it.
