In a striking and calculated move, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has reinforced his grip on power by appointing Mohammad Mokhber, the former Vice President under the slain Ebrahim Raisi, as his special advisor and assistant. This unprecedented appointment coincides with President Massoud Pezeshkian’s visit to New York for the United Nations General Assembly, where he attempts to present a more palatable face of the regime to the international community.

However, while Pezeshkian’s speeches in New York may seek to win favor with the West, Khamenei’s domestic actions tell a different story. In a widely circulated message, Khamenei emphasized Mokhber’s loyalty and accomplishments, stating, “Concerning your dedicated and impactful services in management and economic fields, especially during the late Raisi administration, and your wise policy of employing young, motivated elites, I appoint you as advisor and assistant to the Supreme Leader.”
The Formation of a Parallel Power Structure

This appointment is far more than a mere reshuffling of bureaucratic roles. Mokhber, known more for his compliance than his leadership, is now positioned at the heart of Khamenei’s power structure. His role appears to signal the creation of a parallel government operating directly under Khamenei’s supervision. The message to rival factions within the regime, particularly the Pezeshkian administration, is clear: ultimate power still lies with Khamenei.

The significance of Mokhber’s appointment was underscored by Morteza Talaei, a notorious former police commander turned political figure. Talaei noted, “The Supreme Leader, with precise foresight, intends to utilize Mokhber’s experience and capacities to implement a younger generation of managers across the country.” While Talaei’s comment emphasizes Khamenei’s intention to bring in new blood, it remains unclear whether this has any connection to the recent unveiling of Mojtaba Khamenei, the Supreme Leader’s son, whose growing influence has sparked speculation about succession plans.

Mokhber’s ascension suggests that Khamenei is preparing for more than just a generational transition. From 2007 to 2021, Mokhber was the head of the Execution of Imam Khomeini’s Order (EIKO), one of the regime’s largest financial empires. His leadership in this role involved managing sanctions evasion, ensuring the regime’s financial lifeline, and facilitating its support for terrorism and domestic repression. His loyalty and expertise in maneuvering through international sanctions made him indispensable to Khamenei.

Consolidating Power Amidst Rising Challenges

This development comes at a particularly fragile time for the regime. Ebrahim Raisi, notorious for his role in the 1988 massacre of political prisoners, had been Khamenei’s chosen hardliner to crush dissent and send a clear message to the regime’s loyal forces both inside and outside Iran. During his administration, there was no need for a parallel leadership structure, as Raisi faithfully executed Khamenei’s vision.

In 2021, after two major uprisings, Khamenei installed Raisi as president, former IRGC commander M.B Ghalibaf as head of a handpicked parliament, and a notorious executioner to head the judiciary, signaling a brutal crackdown on dissent. Khamenei also intended to position Raisi for leadership of the Assembly of Experts in 2024 to execute the Supreme Leader’s desired succession plans.

However, after Raisi’s death, the regime’s cohesion began to fray, and to stabilize the regime, Khamenei turned to Masoud Pezeshkian, though reluctantly, after facing a nationwide election boycott and growing factional rifts.

Khamenei feared that Pezeshkian’s appointment could further divide the regime, a concern validated by the backlash from hardliners like the Paydari Front and objections in parliament during the confirmation of key government figures such as Mohammad Javad Zarif and Abbas Araghchi. The 2009 uprising had taught Khamenei that elite infighting can spark mass discontent, leading to potential uprisings.

Under the regime’s constitution, all branches of government are ultimately subordinate to the Supreme Leader. Article 5 asserts that the “leadership of the ummah” falls to Khamenei, while Article 57 places the legislative, executive, and judicial branches directly under his authority. Article 109 further declares that Khamenei possesses the “necessary justice and piety to lead the Muslim community.”

Despite this centralized control, Khamenei’s decision to create this new role for Mokhber signals a shift. His office, which already wields enormous power over Iran’s political, military, economic, and cultural affairs, has never before needed a formal position to directly steer government actions. This widely publicized appointment is meant to send a clear signal not only to rival factions but also to the broader public: Khamenei alone holds the ultimate authority, and his word is final.
Pezeshkian’s Moderate Rhetoric vs. Khamenei’s Hardline Agenda

Pezeshkian has made several ambiguous promises to the Iranian public, including talks of internet freedom, the disbanding of the morality police, and reinstating expelled students and professors. However, none of these promises have been implemented, and it is unlikely that they will be.

In foreign affairs, this dual messaging serves as a strategic smokescreen. By allowing Pezeshkian to make vague promises about better relations with the world, Khamenei buys himself time and deflects criticism, while his real agenda—continuing Iran’s nuclear program, advancing its ballistic missile capabilities, and pursuing regional dominance—remains unchanged. This complex balancing act creates confusion among the international community, rival factions and the public inside Iran but ultimately consolidates Khamenei’s power.

Khamenei’s Puzzle Is Complete—But Will It Hold?

Khamenei, now relying on Pezeshkian, Mokhber, and the newly unveiled “Ayatollah Mojtaba,” is attempting to achieve through these three figures what Raisi once managed alone:

By presenting the sham reformist Pezeshkian, elevating the obedient Mokhber, and positioning his son Mojtaba as “a piety candidate of a successor,” Khamenei’s long-term strategy for survival and succession is to suppress internal dissent, steer the regime through mounting crises, and ensure a seamless transfer of power.

However, the success of this plan is far from guaranteed. The Iranian Resistance, which has consistently defied the regime, remains a formidable force, determined to thwart Khamenei’s carefully constructed strategy. At the same time, the international community’s response to Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, human rights violations, and regional aggression will play a crucial role. Ultimately, it will be the Iranian people, alongside the organized resistance, who will decide the fate of Khamenei’s regime.

Source » ncr-iran