There are no current indications that Iran is weaponizing its nuclear program, but the ongoing conflict in the Middle East has raised concerns that Tehran might finally cross the threshold. How might a nuclear-capable Iran behave? Experts offer differing perspectives on its potential regional and global impact.
Most famously, historian Bernard Lewis argued on Aug. 8, 2006, that Iran would launch a nuclear first strike on Israel on Aug. 22. On the Islamic calendar, this date corresponded with the anniversary of the Prophet Muhammad’s flight on the winged horse Buraq to “‘the farthest mosque,’ usually identified with Jerusalem.” For Lewis, Iranian leaders were irrational “mad mullahs” and could not be deterred because of their apocalyptic worldview.
In another provocative view that raised much attention, political scientist Kenneth N. Waltz argued in a 2012 Foreign Affairs article that fears of an Iranian nuclear bomb had been “grossly” exaggerated and that Iranian leaders would act more cautiously if they got the ultimate weapon. From Waltz’s perspective, Iranian leaders were rational actors who were merely interested in their own survival. Waltz went on to argue that a nuclear-armed Iran would bring stability to the Middle East by making Iran more secure.
While Lewis’s apocalyptic predictions were alarmist and fundamentally misread the Iranian leadership, Waltz’s relaxed view is overly optimistic. Ray Takeyh, meanwhile, argued in 2021 that acquiring nuclear weapons would pose the greatest challenge to the Islamic Republic itself, undermining its security. Experts have also argued that the conflict in Gaza could provide the motive and opportunity for Iran to finally cross the nuclear threshold and develop a nuclear arsenal.
The reality lies somewhere in between Waltz’s optimism and Lewis’s inaccurate read. Over time, the Iranian leadership has shown a consistent pattern of rational calculation when it comes to its strategic decisions, including its nuclear program. For instance, when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, leaders calculated that proliferation attempts could put Iran on the U.S. target list and thus abandoned the country’s weaponization efforts. This pragmatism is reflected in a 2011 report from the International Atomic Energy Agency that concluded that “owing to growing concerns about the international security situation in Iraq and neighbouring countries at that time,” Iran had stopped its work on nuclear weapons in late 2003.
However, the Iranian leadership’s rationality does not mean pacifism. Having ensured its survival, a nuclear-armed Iran would act more confidently on the international stage and could pose new challenges to the security of the region.
For starters, a nuclear weapon arsenal—even if modest—would dramatically enhance Iran’s ability to assert its power in the Persian Gulf. This waterway, a priority for both the Pahlavi monarchy and the Islamic Republic, is crucial to Iran’s national security. Following the British navy’s withdrawal in 1971, the Shah swiftly asserted Iran’s control over the key islands of the Greater and Lesser Tunbs as well as Abu Musa. In 1976, he stated that “the Persian Gulf and the Straits of Hormuz in truth constitute Iran’s lifeline. If this area were in any way threatened, our very life would be endangered.” From his perspective, foreign forces in the Persian Gulf posed a direct threat to Iran’s security.
The leadership of the Islamic Republic shares this strategic outlook. Former Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif has echoed the Shah’s sentiments, stating that the Persian Gulf is a “vital lifeline and thus a national security priority for Iran [and that] any extraregional presence is by definition a source of insecurity.” Iranian forces have frequently harassed U.S. Navy ships in what they view as their own backyard, underscoring Tehran’s continued opposition to any foreign military presence in the region.
With a nuclear deterrent, Iran could more assertively press its territorial claims, such as forcing the United Arab Emirates to back down from its dispute over the Tunbs and Abu Musa and threatening international shipping if its own interests were threatened. Furthermore, nuclear weapons would allow Iran to confront U.S. and other foreign forces in the Persian Gulf with greater confidence, as the threat of nuclear escalation could deter military retaliation.
Iran’s relationship with Israel, in particular, continues to be adversarial. Despite the harsh rhetoric, however, the Iranian leadership is cognizant of Israel’s conventional superiority and nuclear advantage. When, in April, Israel attacked Iran’s diplomatic facility in Damascus, killing an Iranian military commander, Iran responded by launching several hundred ballistic missiles and drones—some of which penetrated the Israeli missile defense system. Yet Iran deliberately downplayed Israel’s retaliatory response, which targeted an air defense system near the city of Isfahan, to avoid a broader conflict with Israel and by extension the United States.
A nuclear-armed Iran would significantly reshape this dynamic. Nuclear weapons could erode Israel’s long-standing monopoly by significantly increasing Iran’s standing in the region. At the same time, they could also exacerbate the ongoing low-intensity conflict between the two states, since both countries could rely on their nuclear arsenals to shield them from conventional escalation, a dynamic widely known as the stability-instability paradox.
Relatedly, nuclear weapons will have a bolstering effect on Iran’s relationship with its proxy forces, namely Hezbollah—one of the pillars of Iran’s defense strategy. This does not mean that Iran would transfer nuclear technology to its proxy force, as this could increase the potential use of nuclear weapons, undermining its own security. But nuclear weapons could reduce the risks and costs associated with supporting these groups, as foreign powers will be further discouraged from deterring Iran’s support for such groups.
More generally, nuclear weapons could reshape the Iranian leadership’s perception of the country’s “rightful” role in geopolitics. Its status as a nuclear power would significantly enhance Tehran’s diplomatic leverage, allowing it to seek security, political, and economic concessions. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad captured this sentiment when he announced in 2006 that Iran had joined the world’s “nuclear club” after successfully mastering the enrichment fuel cycle. Since abandoning its weaponization efforts in 2003, Iran has systematically deployed its expanding nuclear program to seek concessions from global powers that otherwise would not grant Iran a seat at the negotiation table. These include trade, commercial integration, and nuclear safety cooperation embedded in the text of the Iran nuclear deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Indeed, Iran’s nuclear expansion during this period was not driven by security factors but as a leveraging mechanism.
Nuclear weapons would also enable Iran to act more independently of its great-power partners—namely Russia, which is increasingly bringing Iran into its sphere of influence. In this context, nuclear weapons make a partnership with Russia less valuable because Iran would need less protection from Moscow. Nuclear weapons would reduce the costs for Iran to act independently of Russia and even improve ties with the West. This was captured in March 2022 by a Russian commentator who suggested that a nuclear-armed Iran would be far less dangerous than a pro-West Iran. Russia has in the past undermined Iran’s nuclear talks with the West to prevent normalization of that relationship. Iran’s support for Russia in Ukraine has come at a great cost to it.
Iran’s current leaders, like their predecessors, are strongly convinced that Iran is alone and surrounded by hostile states that given the opportunity would not treat Iran well. From Iran’s perspective, a nuclear option is not only a safeguard for its own national survival but also a strategic tool to compel global powers to recognize its legitimate interests. In this sense, nuclear weapons for Iran would serve as the ultimate defense.
When China developed its nuclear arsenal in the 1960s, it too was seen as a “rogue” state, one that had previously fought the United States and actively undermined U.S. policies in its own region. Yet, over time, Washington found a way to coexist with a nuclear-armed China, eventually restoring diplomatic relations. History shows that even adversarial nuclear states can be integrated into the global order, albeit with considerable caution and strategic engagement.
Source » foreignpolicy