Iran’s Mahsa movement (2022-2023) was a non-violent uprising aimed at overthrowing the Islamic rule established in 1979. The government’s sole response was to suppress the protestors because of the movement’s objective.
The reported death toll of 550 protesters far exceeds the regime’s claims of slain special forces and Basij members, whose actual number has never been officially disclosed. In some cases, slain protesters were misreported as Basij members. The protests did not target businesses or government institutions, except for police cars that fired on people.
The government managed to suppress the movement by arresting up to 22,000 individuals, using birdshot against protesters blinding many, killing children and teenagers. Vigilantes or government agents also deployed unexplained chemical substances against schools, sending thousands of teenagers to hospitals. The Mahsa movement, driven by anger from the 2017 and 2019 uprisings, saw the Islamic government and its auxiliaries respond with extreme measures, including kidnapping, killing, executing, and torturing its most defiant participants.
Here’s a streamlined version of the question:
After two years of repression, rising tensions with Israel, and the removal of the Raisi administration, what is the current state of the “woman, life, freedom” movement? Is it in a coma, hibernation, or bubbling like lava under a volcano?
Desperation, despair, or hidden anger?
Iranian society exhibits signs of all three conditions: desperation, despair, and hidden anger. The migration of educated and skilled professionals, including doctors and nurses, has surged. The low voter turnout for Pezeshkian, a candidate promising more of Khamenei’s policies, reflects a sense of desperation rather than hope.
In national strikes by oil, gas, and steel workers, as well as nurses, teachers, and retirees, the prevalent sentiment is one of despair over current conditions rather than active anger. Social media discussions also show less anger.
This suggests that the Mahsa movement’s protesters have come to terms with the regime’s persistence and the improbability of overthrowing it through their current methods. Incidents like the murder of Armita Gravand killed during a confrontation with hijab enforcers, Arzoo Badri’s severe injury, the brutal killing of Mohammad Mir Mousavi, and numerous other acts of police brutality have failed to spark street protests, as government opponents have accepted the reality of their situation.
Disappointed but realistic society
A 2023 nationwide government survey, shared with select correspondents, reveals that 91.8 percent of people are dissatisfied with the country’s current conditions and direction. While the failure of the Mahsa movement to overthrow the government is acknowledged, this does not imply that the populace has forgotten their demands or their dire situation. The survey also indicates that at least 30.2 percent of respondents view the current situation as irreparable under the Islamic Republic, suggesting that, despite the obstacles, they see regime change as the only path to improvement.
Two different kinds of hope
The 60.6 percent of people currently hoping for change, according to the government survey, differs from the 70 percent who supported reformist president Mohammad Khatami in 1996. Khatami’s support stemmed from hopes for stability and economic relief after the upheaval of the revolution and the Iran-Iraq war. In contrast, today’s hope is not connected to the Pezeshkian administration. The current desire for reform focuses on substantial and real transformation. Given the failure of partial and gradual reforms over the past 45 years, many believe that meaningful change through such methods is no longer feasible and aim for a fundamental change in the role of the government and its treatment of citizens. The severe suppression of the Mahsa movement has further diminished hopes for realistic reform.
Obstacles to popular action
There are major obstacles that hinder the unification of the 60% seeking significant change with the 30% advocating for regime change.
Social activism among Iranians has given way to individualism because of the authoritarian nature of the Islamic system. The government is suspicious of non-religious activism, which is not under its control. While during sudden waves of protests crowds spontaneously congregate, organized opposition is rare. Security organs systematically crack down on any signs of organization and many opponents have turned to hopes of seeing a savior, or a major regional conflict or military attack that can topple the regime.
Even charity work has declined in the country, because of constant government crackdowns on independent NGOs.
The protests in 2017, 2019, and 2021 were triggered by specific events, such as the rise in gasoline prices and the killing of Mahsa Amini by the morality police. This suggests that societal movements are driven by immediate sparks and waves rather than a cohesive, long-term strategy to address Iran’s decline. Additionally, effective leadership is lacking.
The underlying discontent within society is like lava beneath the surface, which is why the government has hesitated to again raise gasoline prices. However, the absence of independent organizations and media to channel this dissatisfaction into street protests has left society in a state of political inaction. The constant emigration of protesting youth further weakens the protest movement. The government neither has the means to address the brain drain and skilled labor emigration nor views it as a security threat. In some instances, interrogators even encourage detainees to emigrate.
Source » iranintl