Once again, Iran’s controversial nuclear program has taken center stage at the latest meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board of Governors. The meeting, which began on September 9 and runs until September 13, has raised renewed concerns about the Iranian regime’s nuclear activities.
At the meeting, Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA, expressed alarm over the latest developments in Iran’s nuclear program, specifically highlighting concerns about centrifuge production and the operation of the country’s heavy water reactor. Grossi also expressed a desire to meet with Iran’s newly appointed president, Masoud Pezeshkian, hoping that such a dialogue could help resolve ongoing tensions between Iran and the IAEA. However, this hope seems misplaced, as the real decision-maker in Iran’s nuclear policy remains Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, not Pezeshkian or other officials.
A Pattern of Deception
Grossi’s concerns come in the wake of Iran’s attempts to present a cooperative stance towards the IAEA. In May, the Iranian regime hosted Grossi, claiming that his visit had led to an understanding aimed at resolving long-standing disputes over nuclear sites and enhancing cooperation under the framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). According to the regime, the agreements reached during this visit addressed issues related to two key locations—Varamin (Torquzabad) and Shian—and sought to strengthen verification measures.
However, these gestures appear to be part of a recurring pattern. Tehran often makes overtures of cooperation just before IAEA Board of Governors meetings, seemingly to avoid the passage of resolutions condemning its nuclear activities. This latest round of talks may be no different, as the regime continues its long-standing practice of using such negotiations as a stalling tactic.
The 2023 Understanding: A Fragile Agreement
In March 2023, the IAEA and Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization reached an agreement on three key points. First, both parties agreed that interactions would be conducted in a spirit of cooperation, ensuring compliance with the IAEA’s mandates and Iran’s obligations under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. Second, Iran pledged to continue its cooperation on unresolved issues related to nuclear safeguards at three specific sites. Finally, Iran consented to additional verification and monitoring activities.
Despite these commitments, Iran has since claimed that external factors—specifically, the IAEA and European member states—have impeded progress on the agreement. The regime insists that it remains ready to implement the provisions of the March agreement, even after the death of its former president, Ebrahim Raisi, and former Foreign Minister. Yet, Tehran now argues that external meddling has led to difficulties in maintaining cooperation under the terms of the accord.
Iran’s Latest Demands
Two days ago, Iran’s representative in Vienna outlined the regime’s latest positions on the Director General’s reports to the IAEA Board of Governors. The delegation demanded that issues related to Iran’s nuclear safeguards be separated from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in future IAEA reports. Iran also proposed designing a new framework to implement the provisions of the March 2023 agreement, calling for direct dialogue between Tehran and the IAEA.
The March understanding had explicitly stated that any agreement between the parties would be limited to safeguard provisions. However, Iran’s recent demands suggest that it is seeking more favorable terms and attempting to broaden the scope of the agreement. Additionally, Tehran has called on the IAEA to resist political influences, claiming that the agency must fulfill Grossi’s promise not to use its platform as a political tool. The regime insists that this should be reflected in both Grossi’s reports and his public statements.
Grossi’s Response
In his recent remarks, Grossi confirmed that he had exchanged messages with President Pezeshkian following Iran’s recent elections and expressed his willingness to meet with him in Tehran. Grossi hopes to resume talks and foster greater cooperation between the IAEA and the Iranian regime. Pezeshkian has reportedly given his tacit approval for such a meeting.
However, as many observers have pointed out, these engagements with Iran’s political leadership are unlikely to resolve the core issues surrounding the country’s nuclear program. Supreme Leader Khamenei remains the key decision-maker, and any agreements made with other officials may ultimately have little bearing on Iran’s broader nuclear ambitions.
The October 2025 Deadline and the JCPOA
One of the underlying factors driving Iran regime’s recent diplomatic maneuvers is the looming expiration of the JCPOA in October 2025. Under the terms of the agreement, all restrictions on Iran will be lifted at that time, provided that no major violations occur before the deadline.
On Termination Day, the following key events are scheduled to occur:
UN Security Council Resolution 2231, which endorsed the JCPOA, will be terminated
The Security Council will close Iran’s nuclear file
All remaining UN and EU measures related to the agreement will be terminated
After October 2025, new actions cannot be imposed on Iran’s nuclear program unless the European Troika (France, Germany, and the UK) activates the trigger mechanism, which would reinstate a series of sanctions imposed by six UN Security Council resolutions predating Resolution 2231.
The trigger mechanism allows for the automatic reimposition of sanctions if the parties fail to reach a resolution within 65 days of a violation. Crucially, none of the permanent members of the UN Security Council can veto the activation of the trigger mechanism, making it a powerful tool for the European Troika.
In response, the Iranian regime appears to be maneuvering to avoid triggering the mechanism. By feigning cooperation with the IAEA and proposing new rounds of negotiations, Tehran hopes to neutralize any European attempts to reinstate sanctions. The regime is likely aiming to delay action until the expiration of the JCPOA, at which point it can operate without the threat of international penalties.
Broader International Consensus
Despite these tactics, there is broad international consensus on one issue: the non-nuclearization of Iran. All JCPOA member countries, including China and Russia—both of which have been allies of Iran—agree that allowing Tehran to develop nuclear weapons would have dire consequences. The United States and the European Troika are particularly firm in their stance, fearing that a nuclear-armed Iran would destabilize the already volatile Middle East.
The proliferation of nuclear weapons in the region could spark a dangerous arms race, further entrenching the Iranian regime’s influence and expanding its capacity for regional hegemony. Iran’s support for various militant groups and its role in fueling regional conflicts have long been sources of concern for the international community. If Tehran were to obtain nuclear weapons, those concerns would be amplified significantly.
The outcome of the current IAEA Board of Governors meeting, the last before the expiration of the JCPOA, will play a critical role in determining the future of Iran’s nuclear program and international efforts to prevent its weaponization.
Source » irannewsupdate