On the night of April 14, Tehran retaliated for the elimination of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards’ Lebanon-Syria Corps commander in Damascus two weeks earlier. The mass missile attack was successfully intercepted by Israel and its allies.
On August 25, Israel launched a pre-emptive strike to neutralize Hezbollah’s planned response to the killing of its chief of staff, Fouad Shukr, three and a half weeks prior.
These two events form a crucial turning point in Israel’s evolving strategy.
These incidents convey two messages. First, the offensive actions planned by Iran and Hezbollah were thwarted—one through defensive measures, the other through the impressive offensive capabilities of the Israeli Air Force and the IDF Intelligence Division.
Both instances highlighted a significant gap between our adversaries’ intentions and capabilities versus the actual results.
Second, the IDF’s intelligence capabilities (which faced justified criticism after Oct. 7) demonstrated remarkable accuracy and penetration of our enemies’ plans. This ranged from uncovering initial intentions and getting the timing down to the day and hour.
The triad: Deterrence, intelligence, and offensive capability
The events of April and August have far-reaching implications. They’re part of the IDF’s effort to restore deterrence across the region.
This deterrence is built on intelligence capabilities that identify high-value targets, coupled with formidable military power in both defense and offense.
These factors challenge our adversaries, forcing them to reevaluate their strategies, target selection, and timing. Adding to this is the U.S. support for Israel—in defense, offense, and on the international stage.
Deterrence, though it became a contentious term after Oct. 7, remains crucial and relevant. It will continue to play a central role in the security doctrine being reshaped in the wake of the Gaza war.
When enemies repeatedly see their plans foiled and face severe consequences—with distance (be it Yemen or Iran) no longer providing safety—they’re compelled to change tactics.
Our challenge then becomes staying vigilant and sharp enough to identify these shifts, lest we fall into outdated thinking that leads to misconceptions.
However, actions alone, no matter how significant, aren’t enough. We need to build a comprehensive system that can maximize, analyze, and translate the implications of these operations into an adaptive operational strategy.
In the post-Oct. 7 reality, such moves carry even greater weight. They’re essential for restoring the IDF’s capabilities and perception—both externally against our enemies and internally within Israel.
While they lay an excellent foundation for change, they must be accompanied by complementary measures. Only then can we say we’ve truly learned from Oct. 7 and are actively reshaping the security landscape in our region.
If we’ve chosen to alter the security situation in the north without resorting to all-out regional war—which seems to be the preference of the Israeli government and others—then simply creating a sense of vulnerability through targeted eliminations as seen in both the April and August incidents won’t suffice.
Even proactive threat removal and weakening enemy capabilities—while important—aren’t enough on their own. Although the operation on Aug. 25 offered a chance to disrupt Hezbollah more extensively than they had anticipated in their planned response.
The April and August events draw a clear line—one of intelligence, lethality, deterrence, and the dawn of a new reality. Our success will be measured by how effectively we capitalize on these opportunities to keep reshaping the strategic landscape.
Source » jns