Signaling a promising development in the region’s diplomatic landscape, Bahrain’s Foreign Minister Abdel Latif bin Rashid Al-Zayani flew to Iran in late July to attend the inauguration of new President Masoud Pezeshkian. The visit was Zayani’s third in recent months. After the sudden death of former president Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter crash in May, the top diplomat appeared in the Iranian capital to convey condolences on the part of Bahrain’s King. The following month, Zayani participated in a Tehran meeting of the Asian Cooperation Dialogue (ACD).

The stepped up engagement comes after years of estrangement. When Saudi Arabia cut ties with Iran in 2016, triggered by the storming of its diplomatic facilities by protesters after the Kingdom’s execution of a dissident Saudi Shiite cleric, Bahrain followed suit in solidarity with its key regional ally. Although Riyadh and Tehran managed to normalize relations through a China-brokered deal last year, the same momentum has not extended as quickly to ties between Manama and Tehran.

A troubled past

Bahraini-Iranian relations have ebbed and flowed since Manama gained independence in 1971. A major turning point came with the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, which spread Shiite influence across the region—challenging the Sunni dominance gravitating around Saudi Arabia. Manama came to frequently accuse Tehran of instigating political unrest, including by supporting movements advocating for change and democracy in the island nation through the 1980s. In 1996, Manama placed blame on Tehran for establishing a clandestine organization called “Hezbollah Al-Bahrain”—allegedly aimed at overthrowing the Bahraini government—with claims that members of the group received training in Iran. Since the 2011 Arab Spring uprising, Bahraini authorities have claimed that similar organizations have been uncovered, labeling dissidents as Tehran-backed terrorists and saboteurs.

Throughout this period, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s references to the export of the Iranian revolution to the broader region have led Bahrain to increasingly view Tehran as a serious threat. This is particularly because the Gulf Arab state’s Sunni royal family ruled over a predominantly Shiite population, the same sect that prevails in Iran.

In this context, Bahrain is now the only Arab neighbor of Iran that has not normalized relations. However, in a diplomatic U-turn, King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa announced in a May 2024 meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin that he looks forward to better relations with the Islamic Republic. The monarch indicated that thorny issues had been addressed, stating, “There is no reason to delay normalization,” adding that the two countries “are working towards establishing normal diplomatic, cultural, and trade relations.”

Following the King’s remarks, the Bahraini and Iranian foreign ministers met in Tehran on June 23—on the sidelines of an ACD meeting—where they agreed to establish the necessary mechanisms to kick-start the diplomatic process for resuming ties.

Support from the ground

Bahrainis have overall embraced the regional rapprochement. Speaking to Amwaj.media, political activist Shawqi Al-Alawi underscored the importance of fully restoring ties with Tehran, describing it as in “the unequivocal interest of the peoples of both countries.” Similarly, Iman Showaiter, a lawmaker from the Taqaddom bloc, affiliated with the opposition left-wing Progressive Democratic Tribute, expressed her “support for the Bahraini government’s efforts to resolve outstanding issues with Iran.”

Importantly, Showaiter highlighted the potential economic gains of resuming trade and direct flights—noting that the latter is one of the most profitable routes for Manama’s national airline, Gulf Air. She also pointed out that improved ties would also benefit the many families who frequently travel to Iran.

In an interview with Amwaj.media, Bahraini former diplomat Nizar Radhi explained that rapprochement would ease regional tensions as well as foster dialogue, reconciliation, and trust. He noted that this could also “open the door to economic and trade cooperation”—positively impacting the economic situation in both countries and improving the standard of living for ordinary citizens.

Abdulhadi Marhoon, a former deputy parliament speaker (2002-06), echoed Radhi’s views, emphasizing that estrangement in international relations is never permanent. He highlighted that normalization, especially between neighboring countries, is the natural state of affairs—driven by factors such as the mutual need by Bahrain and Iran to enhance regional stability. In Marhoon’s view, it would also contribute to broader conflict resolution and de-escalation.

The former senior parliamentarian noted that the Gulf region, with its oil wealth and the strategic Strait of Hormuz being the passageway for a significant portion of the world’s fossil energy, stands to gain considerably from improved ties between Manama and Tehran. He concluded that better ties “would translate into major economic benefits for both countries, namely in attracting investment and increasing trade exchanges.” Marhoon also stressed the need for sustained focus on promoting security in the region to combat common threats like terrorism and organized crime—both within the region and beyond.

According to ex-diplomat Radhi, rapprochement could create “fertile ground” for kick-starting consultations and constructive dialogue between the two states. “The possibility that China or Russia—two influential states for Manama and Tehran—could act as mediators increases the chances of success in these efforts in the next phase,” he noted.

When asked about her opinion on the full resumption of ties with Tehran, Bahraini writer and researcher Anisa Fakhro drew comparisons to Manama’s 2020 signing of the Abraham Accords—which normalized relations with Tel Aviv. Describing Iran as “an ancient neighbor with a rich history and civilization,” she contrasted Israel as “forcibly established by the west on Arab land.”

Fakhro further argued that maintaining diplomatic relations with a neighboring country is normal, even if that country may have expansionist aspirations in the Gulf region. This, she added, “Cannot be compared to the boundless Zionist political, military, technological, media and cultural aspirations in the world.”

Sticking points

Despite the clear benefits both nations stand to gain from normalizing relations, obstacles remain—which explains the delay. Political activist Alawi speculated that there might be “undeclared demands on each side,” such as Iran being requested to stop supporting the Bahraini opposition it hosts and to prevent it from engaging in activities against the Bahraini government.

On its part, Tehran may be insisting that normalization is contingent on Manama making progress with Shiite political movements in the island nation—including some form of reconciliation and the release of prisoners, Alawi suggested. “The latter is difficult to achieve, and its implementation may be carried out in stages following an agreement, and at times determined by both sides.” Against this backdrop, Bahrain’s King on Sept. 4 notably pardoned hundreds of detainees.

Radhi attributes the slow progress to the “complex history” between the two neighbors, the accumulation of conflicts over the years, and “the fragility of the situation in the eyes of some internal actors.” He notes that building trust is a time-consuming process, which could be a contributing factor.

The former diplomat further argued that “the current political transition in Iran” may have influenced the pace of progress—including the period between Pezeshikian’s victory in the July 5 runoff and him taking office, and as he waited for his cabinet to be confirmed.

Marhoon, the ex-deputy speaker, told Amwaj.media that he believes the delay is largely due to the fact that ties have been severed for nearly a decade—leaving many issues to be addressed. “Much has changed over the past decade, including financial commitments, international court decisions, and complex developments that cannot be resolved quickly. The matter needs some time.”

Looking at the bigger picture, Showaiter pointed to regional instability, particularly the ongoing Gaza war and the Palestinian issue, as factors that have hampered talks between Bahrain and Iran. Nonetheless, she is “utterly confident that both sides can overcome these difficulties.”

Finally, former diplomat Radhi recommends reactivating the Bahrain-Iran Joint High Committee, a platform initially established to promote cooperation and dialogue but then left dormant after relations deteriorated. He also suggests creating additional mechanisms for communication and coordination, such as direct channels between officials from both countries, or specialized technical committees, to explore areas of mutual interest. This, he thinks, would create a favorable environment for future diplomatic engagement.

Source » amwaj.media