Iran is currently carrying out a severe wave of executions, with a particular focus on political dissidents, women, ethnic minorities and those accused of drug-related offenses. According to a report by Amnesty International, Iran last year reached its highest level of executions in the last eight years, with the judiciary of the Islamic Republic executing 853 people.
The report added that 481 executions, more than half of the total, were related to drug crimes. Since the beginning of 2024, another 300 individuals have been executed, with a significant surge noted in the past few months. July alone saw 49 executions, many of which involved members of ethnic minority groups such as Kurds, Balochis and Ahwazi Arabs.
This new wave of executions is particularly alarming because it targets not just those accused of serious crimes but also political activists and protesters. Many of these individuals have been convicted in trials that lack transparency and fairness and are often based on confessions obtained under torture. The executions are being used as a tool to suppress dissent, particularly in regions with a high concentration of ethnic minorities, which have historically faced discrimination.
The situation has drawn widespread condemnation from international human rights organizations and the UN, which have expressed grave concerns about the lack of due process and the use of the death penalty as a means of political repression. Among those sentenced to death, there has been a rising number of women since the 2022 protests following the death in custody of Mahsa Amini, an Iranian Kurdish woman. According to Iranian activists, the charge of “armed rebellion against the state” is often used by the authorities against political prisoners and dissidents.
One explanation for this could be that the Iranian state is facing a women’s movement that is refusing to back down. The use of the death penalty and other intimidation tactics are the main tool to silence dissent at a time of social discontent. Moreover, the Islamic Republic’s suppression of dissent, particularly in the Kurdistan and Balochistan provinces, stems from a combination of ethnic, political and security concerns. These regions are home to significant ethnic minorities — Kurds in Kurdistan and Balochis in Balochistan — that have long-standing grievances against the central government due to systemic discrimination, economic marginalization and cultural repression.
Both Kurds and Balochis have distinct ethnic identities, languages and cultural practices that differ from the Persian majority. The Iranian government has historically viewed these differences with suspicion, often perceiving them as potential threats to national unity. As a result, the state has imposed restrictions on the cultural and linguistic rights of these minorities, exacerbating tensions.
Masoud Pezeshkian, the new moderate Iranian president, has appointed a Sunni politician as vice president for rural development: 44-year-old reformist Abdolkarim Hosseinzadeh. Since 2012, he has represented the northwestern cities of Naqadeh and Oshnavieh in the Iranian parliament. This appointment is an attempt to develop a more inclusive approach toward Sunni Muslims, who make up about 10 percent of the Iranian population. In the past, Hosseinzadeh has spoken out publicly on several occasions in defense of the rights of Iran’s Sunnis.
The Kurdistan and Balochistan provinces are indeed politically sensitive, with both ethnic and Sunni minorities. Kurdish and Balochi political groups have long sought greater autonomy or independence, sometimes through armed struggle. The Iranian government sees these groups as a direct challenge to its authority and has responded through harsh measures, including widespread arrests, executions and military operations. This is particularly true for groups that the government has labelled as “terrorists” or separatists, even those that engage in nonviolent political activism.
Geopolitically, provinces with Kurdish and Balochi minorities are located in border regions — Kurdistan near Iraq and Turkiye and Balochistan near Pakistan and Afghanistan. These provinces are strategically important but also vulnerable to cross-border insurgency and influence from foreign powers. The Iranian government fears that unrest in these provinces could be exploited by external actors to destabilize the regime. Therefore, the government justifies its repressive tactics as a necessity to maintain national security and sovereignty.
Both provinces suffer from significant economic underdevelopment, which fuels local discontent. The government’s failure to invest in infrastructure, education and healthcare in these provinces contributes to high unemployment and poverty rates. The economic marginalization of Kurds and Balochis is often seen as part of a broader strategy to weaken these communities and reduce their ability to mobilize against the state. In summary, the Iranian government’s suppression of dissent in Kurdistan and Balochistan is driven by a combination of ethnic discrimination, fears of separatism and strategic security concerns, all of which are exacerbated by the provinces’ economic marginalization.
Overall, the rise of the use of the death penalty in Iran since 2022 is another tool to manage the crisis of legitimacy of the Iranian state. The election of the moderate Pezeshkian, who advocates for a more inclusive policy toward Sunnis and ethnic minorities, could be the beginning of a new approach at the highest level of the Iranian state. Nevertheless, despite this new policy at the government level, these social groups remain overrepresented in the number of executions in Iran. It remains to be seen if other Iranian institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, will support the president’s more inclusive policy to promote a diverse society in the next four years.
Source » arabnews