To force Iran to change its geostrategic ambition to become the region’s nuclear hegemon without using force or levying additional sanctions, a new regional order must be created.
This order should be anchored on four interconnected pillars: A regional security pact under the U.S. umbrella, normalization of Israeli-Saudi and Israeli-Arab relations, mitigating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and offering Iran economic incentives and assurances that the United States will not pursue any strategy to precipitate a regime change.
The Israel-Hamas war and the tit-for-tat violent attacks between Israel and Iran may appear as a major obstacle that would prevent the development of such a new regional order. I submit the Gaza war and the heightened tensions between Tehran and Jerusalem are, in fact, the catalyst which makes that possible.
To change the strategy of the United States and Israel, it is essential first to understand the Iranian clergy’s psychological disposition — the way they see themselves and their place in the region, their sense of vulnerability and their motivations to become a regional nuclear hegemon.
National pride and historical legacy
First, Iran is the largest Middle Eastern country territorially, with a population of nearly 90 million, predominantly Shiite Muslims, compared to the approximately 80 million Sunnis in all the Gulf states, Jordan, Iraq and Syria.
Iran is the richest in natural resources, especially oil and minerals. It occupies the world’s most strategic chokepoint location, the Strait of Hormuz, where over one-fourth of the world’s total seaborne-traded oil passes.
Iran takes great pride in its glorious past, and given its advantages, feels it has the right and is best situated to become the region’s hegemon.
Moreover, being the largest Shiite Muslim state affects its national psyche, as it sees itself as the guardian of Shiite Islam and in constant rivalry with the Sunni Muslim world led by Saudi Arabia.
Political and ideological factors
Second, Iran’s nuclear ambition is motivated by the fact that the Middle East is a volatile region reddened with conflicts and rivalries.
Iran desires to assert its dominance and influence, shift the regional balance of power, project strength, deter other nuclear powers — especially Israel — and protect the country and the regime’s longevity.
Thus, from the Iranian perspective, the acquisition of atomic weapons would undoubtedly bolster its regional stature and make it an uncontested power. And it should be accorded special consideration by the West and by its predominantly Sunni neighbors.
Internal political dynamics national pride
Third, Iran seeks to be on par with Pakistan, a nuclear power with a predominantly Sunni population of 252 million.
Iran wants to use its nuclear program to boost national pride, presenting it as a symbol of scientific and technological progress. This helps the government to engender domestic support while distracting, to some extent, the public from internal issues, especially economic challenges and social discontent.
Deterrence
Fourth, Iran is determined to neutralize Israel’s nuclear advantage by creating a mutual nuclear deterrence — a strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) — to ensure the regime’s survival.
In addition, the presence of U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf and Iran’s adversarial relations with the United States further heightens its sense of vulnerability.
With nuclear weapons, Iran would prevent any adversary from attacking it or intervening in its domestic affairs, which could precipitate a regime change that Iran wants to avoid at all costs.
Iran has watched the fates of countries like Libya and Iraq and faced severe consequences after abandoning their nuclear programs.
Furthermore, it is near-certain that Ukraine would not have been invaded by Russia had it not been persuaded to give up its stockpile of nuclear weapons following the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Conversely, nations like North Korea, which have developed nuclear weapons, have managed to secure their regimes against foreign intervention.
Strategic calculations and power dynamics
Fifth, since the inception of nuclear weapons, there has been only one instance where two nuclear-armed states have engaged in direct military conflict: The Kargil War between India and Pakistan in 1999.
Pakistan and India fought three conventional wars, but once they acquired nuclear weapons, the conflict between them was largely reduced to skirmishes while ensuring that any violent encounters did not escalate to a major conflagration.
When the Kargil War broke out after Pakistan crossed the Line of Control (LOC) in Kashmir, both countries acted quickly to contain it, and neither side resorted to using nuclear weapons.
The threat of nuclear escalation acted as a deterrent, preventing full-scale wars between the two nuclear powers, knowing, as Ronald Reagan once said, “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.”
Negotiation leverage
Sixth, Iran’s nuclear program also serves as a bargaining chip in future negotiations and diplomacy.
By stockpiling weapons-grade uranium and advancing its nuclear capabilities, Tehran would be in a stronger position to extract concessions and negotiate better terms in reaching new agreements — including lifting certain sanctions and other economic benefits.
In previous negotiations about its nuclear program, Iran was able to secure incentives in exchange for specific concessions.
Israel’s failure to stop Iran’s nuclear program
Successive Israeli Netanyahu-led governments in particular have consistently portrayed Iran’s nuclear program as an existential threat to Israel.
For Netanyahu, engaging the public in such an ominous narrative served his political purpose to present himself as Israel’s ultimate security guardian.
Though a professed enemy of Israel, Iran, in possession of a nuclear weapon is unsettling, to suggest that Iran would use such weapons against Israel is misleading and counterproductive.
Tehran knows that Israel has a second-strike nuclear capability, and attacking Israel with a nuclear weapon is tantamount to suicide.
To prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, Netanyahu employed every tool at his disposal to sabotage Iran’s nuclear program — including the assassination of several top nuclear scientists, corrupting its computer processing data, raiding a secret storage building and confiscating thousands of nuclear-related documents.
Netanyahu vs. the JCPOA
Beyond that, Netanyahu waged a relentless campaign to kill the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) agreement between the United States and Iran, negotiated by former President Obama.
Netanyahu addressed a joint session of Congress to make his case against the Iran deal. Following the election of Trump as President, Netanyahu persuaded him to withdraw from the agreement. Subsequent negotiations between the Biden administration and Iran to restore or modify the original version of the deal failed to materialize.
Netanyahu, who made it his life mission to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, produced precisely the opposite result through his misguided efforts.
Iran has only accelerated the enrichment of uranium, especially since the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. Presently, Iran has become a de facto nuclear threshold state with the ability to produce enough purified uranium for one bomb in a few months and a nuclear warhead and delivery system within 18 months.
Neutralizing Iran’s nuclear weapon program
To freeze Iran’s nuclear program whereby Tehran would settle on being a nuclear threshold state and not take the final leap to produce a nuclear weapon would be in line with Iran’s public position.
The position is that it does not seek to become a nuclear power and to inhibit regional proliferation of nuclear weapons. To that end, the United States ought to pursue an interlinked four-track strategy:
First, a regional security pact under the U.S. nuclear umbrella
The United States should seek the establishment of a security crescent extending from the Gulf to the Mediterranean that would include Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, the UAE, Jordan, Palestine (the missing link), Israel and Egypt.
This hemispherical security pact would best serve the United States’ and its allies’ national security interests and put Iran in check without force.
This security alliance will be fashioned along the Saudi-proposed U.S. Defense Pact as a precondition to normalization of relations with Israel which includes:
a) U.S. guarantees of Saudi national security,
b) fewer restrictions on U.S. arms sales,
c) assistance from the United States in developing their civilian nuclear program, and
d) significant progress toward the creation of a Palestinian state.
In connection with such a defense pact, only the requirements (a) and (d) are relevant to our discussion.
Second, the normalization of Israeli-Saudi relations
As soon as the Gaza war is concluded, the United States ought to resume negotiations with Saudi Arabia about the normalization of relations with Israel.
Extensive discussions by the Biden administration and Congress regarding the Saudis’ first three requirements have already occurred, and a growing consensus has emerged between the defense establishment and Congress.
This will send a clear message to Iran that the United States intends to move forward with a defense pact with Saudi Arabia, which will be expanded to blunt any Iranian regional ambitions and threats against the countries included in the agreement.
Such a security pact would protect the countries involved and significantly solidify the United States’ unimpeachable military dominance throughout the region.
Third, mitigating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
To meet the Saudis’ final requirement, the United States ought to ensure that any future ceasefire between Israel and Hamas establishes a path that would lead to a permanent Israeli-Palestinian settlement.
As I have stated time and again, Hamas’ attack and the subsequent unfolding horrific war have created a new paradigm.
The U.S. administration, be that under Harris or Trump, must put its foot down and stop just talking about a two-state solution but take whatever measures necessary, a mixture of coercion and inducements, to compel Israel to come to terms with the Palestinians’ unmitigated reality.
Israel’s chief enabler
For decades, the United States has been and continues to be the chief enabler of Israel. The tragic state of affairs in which Israel and the Palestinians find themselves today can be attributed to a high degree to the U.S. policy toward Israel.
With the best of intentions to protect Israel, the United States has inadvertently harmed Israel by committing to safeguard Israel’s national security while providing it with a blanket political cover.
To save Israel from itself, the next U.S. administration ought to make its security and political support of Israel conditional upon Israel’s willingness to make a genuine effort and significant concessions toward the creation of a Palestinian state.
Indeed, even an interim solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict will pull the rug from underneath Iran as it usurps the cause Tehran has exploited for years for its own benefit.
Fourth, offering Iran economic incentives and a promise of no regime change
Offering Iran economic incentives for freezing its nuclear weapons program and ending its threats against Israel will go a long way, as long as Iran is also assured that the United States will not seek or support regime change.
Additionally, the United States should promise Tehran that it will not attack and will also prevent Israel from attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities.
The economic incentives could include lifting certain sanctions, providing access to international financial systems and facilitating foreign investments in Iran’s economy, all of which must be contingent upon Iran’s adherence to nuclear restrictions and transparency.
Conclusion
I admit that the proposed new strategy is a tall order and may seem unfeasible given the history and intractability of these intertwined conflicts.
But then, how much longer and how many more wars, deaths and destruction would it take for the United States to say enough is enough and adopt this new strategy to bring peace and stability to a turbulent region, regardless of how difficult and how long it might take?
Source » theglobalist