Although Iran and Russia have cultivated closer ties in recent years, particularly since the onset of Russia’s war on Ukraine, which has suggested the possibility of a deeper military alliance, Moscow’s actions sometimes reveal underlying tensions between the two nations.
This was highlighted by Iran’s reaction to President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Baku last week and his meeting with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev, which reignited Tehran’s fears about its strategic interests in the Caucasus. These concerns have been exacerbated by the shifts in regional power dynamics following the 2020 war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which disrupted decades of stability and weakened Iran’s influence in the region.
Historically, this region has not aligned with Iran’s interests; instead, it has been a battleground where the vital and essential interests of both Iran and Russia intersect, directly impacting their security and stability. Both nations once exerted sovereignty over this area, leading to a long history of conflicts and disputes. This overlap in interests likely explains Russia’s hesitation to deepen its partnership with Iran, particularly in this region, as doing so could bolster Tehran’s influence as a regional competitor. Moreover, Russia’s key arrangements in the area are seen by Iran as a significant threat to its strategic interests.
Putin’s visit to Azerbaijan unsettled Iran, as it signaled Russia’s intent to revitalize its diplomacy and reinforce its interests in one of its traditional spheres of influence, rather than fully sever ties with the West. Central to this agenda is Putin’s push for a peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which would redefine the borders and potentially expand the territory of Azerbaijan, a historical rival of Iran. Tehran views these developments as a strategic realignment that favors Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkiye at the expense of its own influence.
Iran perceives that Putin’s agenda in the Caucasus aligns with the interests of Turkiye and Azerbaijan, particularly as he backs the establishment of the Zangezur corridor. Russian pressure to realize this project could shift the balance of power in Azerbaijan’s favor against Iran, severing the land link between Iran and Armenia and hindering the flow of Iranian goods through Armenia. This corridor could also diminish the benefits Iran expects from the North-South Corridor and undermine its role in the proposed international trade routes between East and West.
Moreover, Turkiye, Iran’s regional rival, would gain significant influence as the corridor connects it directly to Central Asia, creating a geopolitical and economic arc encircling Iran from the north.
The situation might escalate further, as Armenia, displeased with Putin’s growing ties with Azerbaijan, has accused Russian peacekeeping forces of inaction during Azerbaijan’s swift recapture of the Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2023. As a result, Armenia suspended its participation in the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization and began aligning more closely with the West, sending humanitarian aid to Ukraine and joining the International Criminal Court, which has issued an arrest warrant for Putin.
For Iran, this shift signals several concerning developments. First, the West could gain a new strategic foothold near Iran, potentially inviting NATO and the US into the region, heightening threats to its security. Second, Russia’s presence and influence in Iran’s strategic sphere could grow, with Moscow offering unprecedented support to Azerbaijan. Lastly, the Caucasus may become a cold war zone, sparking new alliances and conflicts that could drain and weaken Iran.
These developments are particularly alarming for Iran as they fuel Turkish and Azerbaijani nationalist sentiments, posing significant threats to its territorial integrity and regional sovereignty. The rising prominence of the Azerbaijani issue along the Iran-Azerbaijan border has the potential to reignite separatist movements, a deeply sensitive matter for Tehran. Given Iran’s diverse population and its complex geographical distribution across borders, these nationalist stirrings could spark secessionist movements not only in the Caucasus but in other regions as well, exacerbating internal rebellions against the Iranian state.
In light of these dynamics, the Caucasus region seems poised to enter a new phase of international and regional competition, with potential transformations that are unlikely to favor Iran. The risk of renewed conflict looms large, particularly after Russia withdrew its peacekeeping forces from the disputed region in April, leading to intermittent clashes.
However, this time, the conflict may extend beyond the two neighboring countries in the Caucasus, attracting multiple players with their own agendas. This could introduce a range of risks for Iran, potentially forcing it to open a new front to defend its sovereignty, interests or waning influence in the region. Iran’s adversaries are likely to exploit this conflict to exhaust and weaken the country, using it as leverage to impact its standing on other fronts.
In conclusion, Russia’s actions and positions frequently raise concerns in Iran, highlighting that their cooperation is often based on temporary, necessity-driven interests. This underscores the limitations of Iran’s eastward pivot, particularly toward Russia, as Moscow shows little hesitation in sidelining Iran when their interests diverge. In the Caucasus, Russia’s maneuvers are likely to revive historical and geopolitical tensions between the two nations, imposing clear limits on their cooperation. This is especially evident given the numerous instances where Iran has not received the support it anticipated from Russia.
Source » arabnews