James Jeffrey, the United States’ former Special Representative for Syria Engagement during the Trump administration, once stated that one of his country’s three main goals in Syria was to limit Iran’s influence. Similarly, current Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Ethan Goldrich has highlighted Iran’s destabilizing presence in Syria, where the Biden administration approved plans to strike Iranian targets earlier this year.
Recent unprecedented escalation between Israel and Iran in the context of the war in Gaza highlights just one of many reasons the US seeks to limit Iran’s influence—both in Syria and in the region.
However, Washington’s decision not to support Arab tribes in their 2023 revolt against its ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), has created an opportunity for Iran to expand in northeastern Syria—one that it is eager to exploit.
Tehran is skillfully taking advantage of American policy missteps to further its interests in Syria, winning the support of Arab tribes in anticipation of a future US withdrawal.
Deir e-Zor uprising
Eastern Syria is home to five main Arab tribes: the Uqaydat, the Baqqara, the Jubour, the Shammar and the Tayy. While a general claim for the stance of any tribe cannot be made, the positions of the most prominent and powerful tribal leaders are significant. A common trend for each tribe is to have figures within it co-opted by a range of different actors. Some may work with the US and the SDF, while others work with Turkey and the Syrian opposition. Still others may align themselves with Russia, Iran and the Assad regime.
These five tribes in eastern Syria comprise the vast majority of Arab residents in the area under the influence of the SDF—and by extension its backer, the US—in Syria. Most of them, except parts of the Tayy tribe, are governed by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES).
The AANES, a self-declared governing body, is dominated by the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (PYD), whose armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), is the main component of the SDF. The PYD was established as the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, which is listed as a terrorist organization by both Ankara and Washington. For this reason, many members of Arab tribes and clans refer to the YPG as the PKK.
When an Arab tribal uprising broke out in SDF-held parts of Syria’s eastern Deir e-Zor province on August 28, 2023, it ushered in a significant shift in the intricate power dynamics of northeastern Syria. This rebellion was triggered by the arrest and imprisonment of Ahmed al-Khubail (Abu Khawla), the leader of the SDF-affiliated Deir e-Zor Military Council.
The circumstances surrounding al-Khubail’s detention shed light on the deep-seated tensions and strategic maneuvers that define the ongoing conflict in the region.
On August 27, the SDF invited al-Khubail and other top leaders to a meeting at a base in Hasakah province following a two-month dispute. Once there, the group was encircled and al-Khubail was arrested. This strategy—inviting a target to a meeting, only to detain them—sparked widespread local resentment, particularly as it is similar to tactics previously used by the Islamic State (IS), as several tribesmen told the author.
The arrest came at a time of increasing tensions between the YPG and the Deir e-Zor Military Council. Al-Khubail’s clan, al-Bakir, had taken action the month before against previous attempts to remove him from power. While al-Khubail’s detention was initially presented as a crackdown on corruption, the political wing of the SDF later stated that al-Khubail was arrested due to his alleged connections with Iran and the Assad regime.
Initially, the uprising resulted in significant territorial advances by the Uqaydat and Baqqara tribes, which took control of the southern areas of Deir e-Zor and detained more than 100 SDF forces by September 3. Their main demands were for the withdrawal of YPG forces, direct cooperation with the US, and efforts to liberate areas west of the Euphrates from Iranian and Assad regime control.
During nearly two weeks of clashes, tribes in Turkish areas of influence in northwestern Syria also mobilized. Groups from Idlib, Afrin and other areas launched attacks against the SDF, but their advances were short-lived due to Russian airstrikes. Moscow indicated that it would not allow pro-Turkish Arab tribal forces to intervene in the conflict against the YPG-dominated SDF. By September 5, the SDF had reclaimed most of the territory it lost.
In an effort to restore calm, US officials facilitated an important meeting between SDF and tribal representatives on September 2-3. Key leaders of the uprising were notably excluded from this meeting. As a result of the discussions, the SDF announced conciliatory measures, releasing local fighters and issuing a general amnesty. Paradoxically, they also continued to detain influential tribal figures.
Perceived American betrayal
When the Arab tribes revolted against the SDF in Deir e-Zor, they had one main hope: that the US would support the Arab tribes and limit the YPG’s influence in Arab-dominated areas. Militarily, their chances against the YPG-dominated SDF were limited. However, to the surprise of tribal forces, the US chose to side with the YPG and SDF leadership.
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Ethan Goldrich and Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve Commander Major General Joel B. Vowell attended the September 2023 meeting in Deir e-Zor. They chose to ignore a negotiation committee set up by the Arab tribal forces, meeting instead with tribal representatives selected by the SDF. These representatives had little real power or control over the tribes they claimed to represent.
Following the meeting, the US greenlit a forceful suppression of the revolt by the SDF, which launched an offensive and recaptured territory it lost. The last pocket of resistance, in the Deir e-Zor town of Dhiban, ended with the surrender of the Arab tribal forces. The uprising’s leader, Ibrahim al-Hafel, fled to the regime-controlled western side of the Euphrates River to seek refuge among his tribespeople.
The tribesmen of Deir e-Zor formed a strong perception of an American betrayal. One senior Uqaydat tribal figure told the author he now believes the US-led international coalition secretly supports Iranian expansion, conspiring with “the PKK” to push the tribes towards Iran.
These beliefs seem to stem from a US policy mistake rather than a conspiracy. However, it is significant that such conspiracy theories are circulating in Deir e-Zor, and that senior tribal figures openly express them. A senior tribal figure from the Baqqara tribe said: “Were it not for the US, the PKK could not maintain its control over us.”
All sources contacted by the author asked to remain anonymous for fear of retaliation against themselves or their relatives.
Iran steps in
After Ibrahim al-Hafel fled to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, Iran seized the opportunity and took action. Despite past animosity between al-Hafel, Iran and the Assad regime, the latter—under Iranian guidance—enabled a permissive environment for tribal forces to attack the SDF-held side of the Euphrates River by using regime-held areas as a staging ground.
Iran has since increased the level of cooperation from merely permitting access to facilitating direct engagement between the Assad regime and al-Hafel. This past February, al-Hafel met with pro-regime tribal figures in Damascus and agreed to coordinate action further. Since then, tribal forces loyal to him have continued to attack SDF forces and checkpoints in eastern Deir e-Zor.
While employing this strategy in the Deir e-Zor region, Iran pursues similar ends by other means further to the north. Northeastern Syria, particularly the area around the Hasakah province city of Qamishli, has a distinct demographic makeup. In Qamishli, Kurdish populations are concentrated in the east and west—along the Turkish border—while Arabs and Kurds live together in the city center. Most Arabs in this area belong to the Tayy tribe, which the Baath Party historically supported and settled in the area as part of its 1970s Arabization policies. As a result, the regime’s influence in the city persists through the Tayy tribe’s presence. Today, Qamishli is mainly SDF-controlled, while the regime maintains a presence at its airport and Tayy tribe neighborhoods.
However, conflicts occasionally arise between the National Defense Forces (NDF), mainly composed of the Tayy tribe, and the SDF, often resulting in SDF victory or Russian-mediated resolutions. Russian officers usually favor the SDF in these mediations. On the other hand, Iran directly supports the Tayy tribe. Recently, Tehran-backed Hezbollah’s involvement in the Qamishli area has provided military training and weapons to members of the tribe. Iran also pays salaries.
As a soft-power tool, Iran deploys a propaganda effort towards the Tayy tribe, seeking a shared narrative based on historical events—notably the Tayy tribe’s support for Ali ibn Abi Talib in the seventh-century Battle of Siffin. By using this narrative, Iran aims to circumvent Sunni-Shia differences and construct a joint history. Despite this support, the SDF holds logistical superiority in Qamishli. Iran knows it cannot balance the SDF without direct Russian support, and is creating an alternative military presence for the Tayy tribe in Deir e-Zor, where new military formations are being established in areas dominated by Iran-backed Shia militias.
It remains to be seen what impact, if any, the election of Iran’s new reformist president Masoud Pezeshkian could have on the country’s Syria policy. What is clear is that Tehran has a long-term strategy of building relationships with Arab tribes in preparation for a potential withdrawal of American forces from Syria. This appears unlikely to change. Like in neighboring Iraq, Iran has strategically positioned itself to be ready to fill the void.
Iran anticipates the US will not coordinate any withdrawal with Turkey, and aims to take advantage of an uncoordinated and abrupt pullout. To this end, Iran has deployed militias it backs along the Euphrates River to ensure dominance in the region. It has also strengthened its presence along the Iraqi-Syrian border by mobilizing Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) near the al-Qaim region and the Sinjar Mountain. Additionally, Iran has invested in its relationship with the aforementioned Tayy tribe in Qamishli, located near the Turkish-Syrian border.
The objective is clear: Once the Americans withdraw, Iran and its affiliates could advance from the west, south and east while leveraging the Tayy tribe in the north to reach the Turkish border before Ankara has the chance to launch an military operation of its own into this part of Syria, as it has long threatened. Limiting Turkish influence and presence in Syria is a geostrategic Iranian goal. There is, however, a potential obstacle in the form of Arab tribes east of the Euphrates River who are not aligned with Iran. If they resist, Iran’s progress could be hindered, potentially preventing the forces it backs from reaching the Turkish-Syrian border in time.
Iran’s success hinges on speed and taking advantage of a sudden American withdrawal. In that scenario, US forces are expected to exit from the south to the north via the Fishkhabour crossing into Iraqi Kurdistan. If Iran can keep pace, Turkey would be unable to intervene until the American withdrawal is complete.
The decision by the US not to support the aspirations of Arab tribes opposed to YPG domination worked in favor of Iran and provided it with a significant opportunity. With al-Hafel changing allegiance, the Uqaydat tribe will likely assist Iran in advancing east of the Euphrates. Between the Uqaydat and the Tayy tribes are the Baqqara, the Shammar, and the Jubour tribes. Iran is currently attempting to gain the support of these tribes as well.
Other players
The Baqqara tribe initially supported the Arab revolt against the YPG-dominated SDF, but later decided to reconcile with the SDF leadership. However, during this process, the Baqqara tribe could not engage directly with the US as the SDF prevents the tribes from meeting American officials directly, limiting interaction to only figures it approves. “Only Haj Bashir of our tribe can speak with the Americans,” one senior tribal figure from the Baqqara tribe told the author. Haj Bashir is the most senior tribal leader of the Baqqara tribe who chose to reconcile with SDF leadership.
While the US limits its involvement by seeking approvals from SDF leadership, Iran is increasingly engaging with the Baqqara. Tehran is using tribal leader Nawaf al-Bashir as its representative to communicate with the Baqqara tribe and recruiting tribesmen into its ranks, with the Liwa al-Baqir brigade seeing a rise in recruits. “Many of our youth are choosing to join Iran to fight against the PKK,” the same Baqqara figure said.
Under Iranian auspices, in May the Assad regime organized a meeting of influential tribal figures, including Ibrahim al-Hafel of the Uqaydat tribe, Sheikh Alaa al-Labad from the al-Boushaban tribe in Raqqa, and Subhi al-Hanan, a prominent member of the Baqqara tribe, and announced the formation of a new military unit called Saraya al-Boushaban.
Winning the Jubour and the Shammar tribes over has been more difficult. “We are against Iran, and we will not allow them to enter our areas,” one senior Jubour tribe figure said. These sentiments are similar to those expressed by the Uqaydat before the 2023 uprising and its fallout.
The Jubour tribe did not participate in the uprising, and thus avoided being suppressed in its aftermath. If a similar incident or direct escalation between the Jubour tribe and the SDF were to occur, it could lead to a similar outcome as it did with the Uqaydat.
While this is true, one significant figure must be considered: Mahmoud al-Maslat, a member of the Jubour tribe’s prominent Maslat family who previously resided in the US. Following the AANES’ declaration of a new Social Contract in late 2023, al-Maslat was chosen as the co-chair of the AANES’ Syrian Democratic Council (SDC).
Mahmoud al-Maslat does not represent the entire Maslat family, however. Salem al-Maslat, who has a stronger claim on tribal leadership due to lineage, once led the Turkish-supported political Syrian opposition. Other family members, like Rafek Mijer al-Maslat, Hasan al-Maslat, and Nawaf Abdulaziz al-Maslat, have aligned themselves with Iran. They have some hundred men under arms fighting for Iran in Syria, according to a senior tribal figure. In reaching out to the Jubour tribe, he said Iran honors it from a religious perspective, emphasizing the tribe’s lineage to Prophet Muhammad (PBUH).
The Shammar tribe, meanwhile, differs from the other four tribes in eastern Syria. It is a Bedouin tribe with a long history of relations with the Kurds in the area, supporting them during the Iraqi-Kurdish wars between 1961 and 1975. The Shammar tribe is aligned with the SDF, helping them with their al-Sanadid Forces.
In conclusion, the US strategy in Syria has inadvertently strengthened Iran’s influence among the Arab tribes. By choosing to support the YPG-dominated SDF over the tribes during the 2023 uprising in Deir e-Zor, Washington has alienated those who now perceive this as a betrayal. This perception has driven many tribal leaders to ally with Iran, which has been quick to exploit the situation by offering support and forming strategic relationships with them. Iran’s long-term strategy is to prepare for a potential US withdrawal by establishing a strong presence through these alliances, thereby ensuring its regional dominance. The US’ decision to unconditionally support the SDF has provided Iran with a critical opportunity to expand its influence in Syria.
Source » syriadirect