The Iranian regime is currently grappling with four significant crises: a crisis of legitimacy, a crisis of efficiency, a crisis of internal unity, and a crisis within its apparatus of repression.
These issues are compounded by widespread corruption among the wealthy ruling class and the regime’s inability to deceive the populace, coupled with increasing international pressure. As a result, maintaining an atmosphere of fear and control has become increasingly challenging for the security apparatus.
The Regime’s Response to Growing Discontent
In an effort to stave off potential uprisings and address growing dissatisfaction both internally and externally, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei decided to appoint the next president from the so-called reformist faction. This strategic move aimed to delay any new uprisings by presenting a façade of reform and change.
Regarding the selection of Masoud Pezeshkian as the next president, Reuters reported on July 18:
“When intelligence officials briefed Iran’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in May ahead of a snap presidential election, their report was grim: angered by economic hardship and crackdowns on social freedoms, most Iranians planned to boycott the vote and turnout would only be about 13%.
That’s when Khamenei decided to plan a carefully orchestrated election, setting the stage for a little-known but trusted moderate, Massoud Pezeshkian, to rise to the presidency in a race that would initially be dominated by hardliners, five people with knowledge of the matter told Reuters.”
Public Boycott and Internal Disputes
The critical situation was evident in the widespread boycott of the regime’s elections by the Iranian populace. In a meeting with the heads of the principlist headquarters, Pezeshkian highlighted the alarming low participation rates:
“In the second round of the parliamentary elections, only 8% participated, and this amount of participation was very dangerous. If the participation of the people in the presidential elections continued like this, unfavorable conditions would prevail, and the whole system would be questioned.”
Despite Khamenei’s decision, internal disputes among the regime’s factions remain unresolved. In his latest speech, Khamenei emphasized the need for unity and support for the new government:
“My strong advice that I wrote down here is constructive interaction with the new government. Everyone should help the elected president to fulfill his duties towards the country. If we can behave in such a way that the president succeeds, this is the success of all of us. If he succeeds in advancing the country’s economy, the country’s international issues, in the country’s cultural issues, we all achieved success. His victory is the victory of all of us. We really have to believe this from the bottom of our hearts.”
Kayhan daily, Khamenei’s mouthpiece, issued a stern warning to Pezeshkian:
“Be careful, they want to make Gorbachev out of you. Undoubtedly, there is a distance of less than a hair between becoming Gorbachev (i.e., the transformation of the system) and Bani Sadri (i.e., removal) in Iran’s politics. Failure to pay attention to it can have dangerous effects on the country’s future, and Iran will move from the era of ‘Operation True Promise’ (2024 Iranian strikes against Israel) to the stage preceding the stabilization.”
Deepening Internal Cracks
An article on the state-run website Fararu, quoting Abbas Abdi, a member of the regime’s reformist faction, highlighted the growing internal disputes:
“There are two deep cracks in the political structure of Iran. The first crack is within the power structure, and the other is between the power and the people. In Iran, the governmental forces are not complementary; they are opposed to each other. Most of the power is in the parliament in legislation, approving the budget, and approving the ministers, but they are in opposition mode.
“There is a gap between the government and the people. With some normal problems that have been solved in the world, such as inflation, pricing, and currency prices, it is something that should not exist anywhere, but it exists in Iran. There is a gap between the government and the nation. Gasoline prices were increased three times in Rouhani’s government. Twice, most of you don’t know, but everyone remembers the third time, which caused the crisis of 2019.
“Therefore, it is not possible to take a step forward as long as there is a gap at the level of the government and the nation, or at the level of the government.”
The Regime’s Deadlock
Masih Mohajeri, the editor of Jomhouri newspaper, also warned Pezeshkian, reflecting the regime’s deadlock:
“You and your experts can bring the country’s economy out of the crisis only when the country’s foreign policy undergoes a fundamental change. Because this is beyond your control, even though you are a heart surgeon, you cannot operate on the heart of the country’s sick economy. You saw that the 13th government performed surgery, but because his knife was rusty, this patient had such a severe fever that it went as far as to die. Due to the fact that the affairs are in the hands of the principlist faction, there is nothing for you to do, neither in elections, nor in citizenship rights, nor in other cases.”
The Iranian regime’s current situation is precarious, with deep-seated internal and external issues that need addressing. The selection of a so-called reformist president is a temporary measure that is not sufficient to resolve the regime’s multifaceted crises.
Source » irannewsupdate