President Ebrahim Raisi’s Death.

On May 19th, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Minister of Foreign Affairs Hossein Amir-Abdollahian died in a helicopter crash in eastern Azerbaijan.

The deaths of President Raisi and his close collaborator took by surprise not only the Iranian population but also the entire international community, as they occurred in a particularly delicate period for Tehran due to the numerous internal and international challenges it had to face, such as the recent escalation of tensions with Israel in April.

Following this tragic event, as required by the Iranian Constitution, Vice President Mohammad Mokhber assumed the interim Presidency in Iran, and, he organised new presidential elections for June 28th.

Raisi’s death has put the current Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei in serious difficulty since Raisi was the favorite candidate to replace him. According to Khamenei, Raisi would have been the perfect successor not only because they both shared the same clerical positions, but also because before becoming President, he worked in one of the most famous Institutions of Iran, which is the Assembly of Experts.

The government of Ebrahim Raisi (2021-2024): a brief summary.

Ebrahim Raisi officially came to power in 2021. Although, he inherited numerous issues due to the COVID-19 pandemic and to the international sanctions due to non-compliance with the JCPOA, he always showed more interest in regime security than in economic relief.

In this regard, his government had not only intensified surveillance and censorship but also had dramatically increased the number of executions. Therefore, in this rather worrying climate, those who paid the most for the consequences were women and ethnic and religious minorities.

His attitude did nothing but increase dissent from the Iranian population, causing the start of numerous protests. Iranians, as a matter of fact, protested in the cities after Mahsa Amini died while she was in custody for wearing “improper” clothing.

Her death highlighted numerous internal issues, such as the subjugation of women, the suppression of minorities and the government’s indifference towards the well-being of Iranians.

During these protests, women took the lead role, removing their veils and cutting their hair during public demonstrations.

However, during the Israel-Hamas conflict, Raisi increasingly demonstrated a hostile attitude towards Israel. In this regard, Iran’s allies (Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi forces in Yemen) have done nothing but increase attacks against the country of Israel.

Yet, Raisi provoked a worrying escalation of tensions in April, when Israeli forces killed Senior Officers of the IRGC Quds Force in Damascus, to which Iran responded by launching drones and missiles into Israel’s territory. The Iranian President, after the attack, urged Israel not to react, otherwise there would be other more severe responses.

Days later, however, Israel attacked Iran again, but Raisi preferred to remain silent because, according to Iranian officials, all Israeli attacks had been intercepted.

The choice of the eight candidates for the elections.

At the beginning of June, the Guardian Council, which is the body dominated by the ultra-conservatives who must choose suitable candidates for the elections, gave the green light to only six candidates out of the 80 registered.

Most of them were conservatives with strong anti-Western positions, while on the other side, there was only one reformist candidate: Massoud Pezeshkian.

The women who ran were unfortunately disqualified, as were other prominent moderates and reformists, including former Speaker of Parliament Ali Larijani and former First Vice President Eshaq Jahangiri.

Among the ultra-conservatives, the candidates were Said Jalili, Alireza Zakani and Amir-Hossein Qazizadeh Hashemi.

Said Jalili is known for leading the delegation that led negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, only to oppose the resumption of talks in 2015 after the United States withdrew from the deal.

Alireza Zakani, famous for his aggressive rhetoric and attacks on reformists and for leading the campaign of repression to impose the hijab on women, has sharply criticized the negotiations with the West over the JCPOA. Furthermore, he is subject to sanctions by the United Kingdom as he is accused of committing serious human rights violations.

Amir Hossein Ghazizadeh Hashemi, had been appointed by Raisi as Vice President and head of the Foundation for Martyrs’ and Veterans’ Affairs, which has always been subject to sanctions for providing financial resources to terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah.

Mohammad-Bagher Qalibaf was the favorite in the elections. This should not be surprising as he is strongly supported by the Pasdaran, has close relations with the Supreme Leader’s circle and enjoys support among centrists. At the same time, he is known for being involved in numerous corruption scandals.

Mostafa Pourmohammadi, however, is the least favoured candidate. Together with Raisi, he was one of the exponents of the “Death Committee”, sadly known for having approved the execution of multiple political prisons in the 1980s.

On the reformist front, there was Massoud Pezeshkian who harshly criticized not only the government for the lack of transparency during the protests due to the death of Mahsa Amini, but also for having made the hijab mandatory.

He is a big supporter of the JCPOA and he promised to improve relations with the United States. He has criticized his conservative rivals for ruining the country’s economy and for not doing enough to revive the JCPOA.

Despite the harsh criticism of the Raisi government, he has never openly criticized Khamenei, indeed, he openly supports some fundamental principles of the regime, among which, the United States would be responsible for tensions in the Middle East.

Massoud Pezeshkian’s victory: objectives and obstacles.

On July 6th, Massoud Pezeshkian defeated the ultra-conversationalist Saeed Jalili in the runoff, and, he officially became Ebrahim Raisi’s successor.

His victory is very important as it would allow Iran to improve its international image and, consequently, attempt to restore relations with the West, in particular with the United States.

As already specified before, the good intentions presented by the New President are numerous, but at the time, there are various obstacles that he could encounter.

For example, to restore relations with the West, it is important that Pezeshkian adopts diplomatic actions that include incessant dialogue with countries and openness to wanting to discuss critical issues of which Tehran has been accused, such as respect for human rights and civil liberties and negative consequences for women if they did not wear the veil in public.

Only by taking small but significant steps, it will be possible for Tehran to clean up its image and avoid being once again the center of criticism and hostility from the West.

At the same time, obstacles could arise, above all, from conservative Iranian groups which have always perceived the West as a threat to the values ​​and principles promoted by the country. But not only that, even terrorist organizations, such as Hezbollah or the Houthis, which receive constant support from Tehran, could perceive this rapprochement as negative as they could see themselves lacking of financial, logistical and military support. Furthermore, an Iran that maintains constant relations with the West would have the consequence of being forced to conform to international standards regarding terrorism by adopting measures to counter its financing and, as a consequence, Iran could lose allies who have always supported it.

It must be specified that strengthening relations with the West would imply a new advantage for Iran: the resumption of JCPOA negotiations and an easing of sanctions. In this regard, it is essential that Pezeshkian re-establishes contacts with the other signatory countries of the Agreement, such as the EU, Russia and China.

But not only that, it is essential that Tehran shows its real intention to pursue a peaceful nuclear program, respecting the limits set by the JCPOA and that it shows itself available to possible controls by the IAEA.

Again, conservative parties could hinder the resumption of negotiations for the same reason: they have deep distrust towards the West, especially, after Trump’s unilateral decision to withdraw from the Agreement and resume sanctions against Tehran.

As a matter of fact, they fear that other States might push for an abandonment of the JCPOA and, consequently, adopt heavier sanctions.

The United States should not be underestimated, especially if Trump were to win the Presidential elections again in November 2024. Given the enormous influence of the United States in the international community, it is likely that Trump will exert some pressure on European allies to avoid a restoration of JCPOA. In fact, he could adopt economic sanctions against all States that continue to have relations with Iran. Threats that should not be underestimated as they were already taken into consideration shortly before withdrawing from the JCPOA.

To conclude, from what has been said, it is easy to understand how the new Iranian President Pezeshkian finds himself faced with a multiplicity of challenges and oppositions both internal and external. It is important, therefore, that he adopts adequate strategies aimed not only at guaranteeing internal stability in Iran, but that allow the country to become a key player on the international scene.

Source » iari