In a rare admission, Brigadier General Behrouz Esbati, a senior commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), acknowledged significant setbacks suffered by the clerical regime of Iran in the Syrian conflict. His remarks, delivered in an hour-long audio recording published by Iranian state-controlled media, offer a stark departure from Tehran’s usual narrative of strength and control. “We were struck in Syria,” Esbati stated unequivocally, warning, “Now is not the time to escalate military tensions in the region.”
Behrouz Esbati, head of the Cyber Space Operations Base of the Armed Forces General Staff and one of the reigme’s commanders in Syria, who claimed to have been present on the ground during the final days of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, painted a grim picture of the situation in Syria. He detailed systemic issues that plagued Assad’s military forces, including widespread corruption, unpaid salaries, and a collapse in morale. “Electricity shortages and poverty-driven corruption had consumed the entire Syrian military. Most of the soldiers in Aleppo fled even before the opposition forces arrived,” he said.
Russia’s Role and Assad’s Resistance
The commander sharply criticized Russia’s involvement in the conflict, accusing Moscow of undermining Iranian efforts by disabling radar systems and allowing Israeli strikes on Iranian bases. “Whenever they were about to hit our major headquarters, like when they struck our martyr Sadeq intelligence center, [the Russians] disabled the radar systems so Israel could carry out the attacks,” he claimed. Esbati also alleged that Russia’s actions were instrumental in the eventual collapse of the Assad regime, accusing Moscow of “acting entirely in the interest of the Zionist regime after the October 7 Hamas offensive.”
Esbati also described a critical moment when Iran urged Syria to launch an offensive against Israel following the Hamas attack, known as the “Storm of Al-Aqsa.” Assad, however, refused. “We told him it was time to take back the lands stolen by the cursed Israel, and we promised support. He said, ‘I am just a logistical support platform for your resistance. Fight your battles, but don’t involve me,’” Esbati recounted, revealing stark differences in their approaches to the so-called axis of resistance.
Esbati did not shy away from acknowledging Iran’s losses. “We didn’t lose Syria in a proud way. We were hit hard. As someone said, ‘We lost, and we lost badly.’ It was particularly painful for people like me,” he admitted. However, he pushed back against claims that the resistance had collapsed entirely. “The resistance is not gone. We can now activate the networks we’ve built over the years in this changed environment,” he insisted.
Blame Shifting and IRGC’s Role
Despite his candid tone, Esbati’s narrative conspicuously avoids addressing the IRGC’s own failures during the Syrian conflict. Observers, including Ehsan Aminolraya of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), argue that the IRGC’s inability to sustain its military efforts was a decisive factor in the rapid collapse of Assad’s regime.
In an interview, Aminolraya highlighted the disintegration of IRGC forces in key battles, stating, “The IRGC’s troops, despite being well-armed and numerous, abandoned their posts. This wasn’t a tactical retreat; it was a collapse driven by their refusal to fight.” He noted that the IRGC’s internal chaos and plummeting morale, not just external factors, sealed the fate of Tehran’s mission in Syria.
“The IRGC’s failures in Syria mirror the Iranian regime’s broader vulnerabilities,” Aminolraya added, emphasizing that the state-controlled media’s release of Esbati’s remarks must not be taken as an honest reckoning. Instead, it reflects Tehran’s attempt to shape a narrative that blames external actors like Assad and Russia while deflecting scrutiny from its own military and strategic failures.
Conflicting narratives
Esbati’s stark warnings against escalating military tensions and his admission of defeat in Syria underscore the Iranian regime’s fragile position. As he stated in the audio recording, “Dragging the region into a new phase of military conflict doesn’t serve the resistance’s interests. Escalation now would only invite intensified attacks from the enemy.”
While the clerical regime officially maintains a hostile tone—evident in Supreme Leader Khamenei’s frequent speeches and public vows by IRGC and other officials promising revenge against Israel—these statements often serve as psychological warfare. Warnings about de-escalation, as articulated by Esbati, should be understood within the context of the regime’s complex strategy to gauge and control public opinion.
The Iranian regime is navigating a precarious balance. On one hand, it must shield itself from regional and international pressures, particularly after suffering setbacks like the collapse of its strategic stronghold in Syria. On the other hand, it aims to project an image of strength to prevent internal dissent and avoid appearing weak to adversaries. This tightrope walk is compounded by a significant morale problem within the regime, particularly among security forces, whose failures in Syria have exposed vulnerabilities.
As Aminolraya concluded, “This is not just a retreat; it is a testament to Khamenei’s failure in leadership. The IRGC’s debacle in Syria has exposed the regime’s vulnerability. When the suppressive apparatus weakens, uprisings gain momentum.” For Tehran, the fall of Assad’s regime is more than a regional setback—it is a warning of the existential challenges it faces at home and abroad.
Source » ncr-iran